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VALIDITY OF STATE RESTRICTIONS ON TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION TO THE UNITED STATES*
FREEDOM in making a will, while an accepted principle of American law,1
is seldom considered a constitutionally protected right.2 Accordingly state
statutes prescribe the persons capable of making a will,3 detail the requisite
formalities, 4 and determine what property may be devised." California and a
leaves me cold. Enforcement or protection of the rights of an indhidual is surely not
adequate if it turns on the amount or increase of the judicial labors in thc Federal
courts. It may be true that ninety-nine out of every hundred petitions of these con-
victs, who allege that the rights of the Federal Constitution were denied them, are
mistaken, and the applications are without merit, On the other hand, it may be that
one in a hundred is entitled to the relief. Clearly, no Federal court may say nay, before
hearing, to any petitioner who, in or out of jail asserts his confinement resulted from a
denial of a right so treasured as those found in the Federal Constitution." Judge Evans
concurring in Potter v. Dowd, 146 F2d 244, 249 (7th Cir. 1944) (emphasis added). Judge
Evans has suggested that if the courts are too busy to hear petitions, a separate court be
created for this purpose. Id. at 250.
*Estate of Burnison, 33 Cal.2d 638, 204 P2d 330, aff'd sub nom. United States v.
Burnison, 18 U.S.L. WaEz, 4190 (U.S. March 13, 1950).
1. See, e.g., it re Rahn, 316 Mo. 492, 502, 291 S.W. 120, 124, cart. denied suib nor.
M-artin v. Ahrens, 274 U.S. 745 (1927) ; TnomnsoN, WmLs § 17 n2 (3d ed. 1947).
2. "Nothing in the Federal Constitution forbids the legislature of a state to limit,
condition, or even abolish the power of testamentary disposition over property within its
jurisdiction." Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942). See 1 PAcEF, WnLLs
§ 25 n.l (3d ed. 1941); Tn, FEDER.AIST, No. 33 at 201 (Modern Library ed. 1937)
(Hamilton cites descent as one field into which Congress might not trespass); ef. Morton,
The Theory of Inheritnce, 8 HARv. L. REv. 161, 162 (1S94); MilL, Pnu.ciPius OF
PoLITcA. EcoNoY bk II, c. II § 4 (Ashley ed. 1923). Wisconsin is alone in asserting
that freedom of testation is constitutionally protected. See Will of Rice, 150 Wis. 401,
444-7, 136 N.W. 956, 973-4 (1912). Even Wisconsin, however, is willing to grant that
testation may be subjected to reasonable legislative regulation. Nunnemacher v. State,
129 Wis. 190, 108 N.V. 627 (1906).
But state power to regulate devolution of property, while broad, certainly has some
constitutionally imposed limitations. See Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) (treaty
provisions will prevail over any conflicting requirements of state probate law) ; Buchanan
v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (city ordinance preventing alienation of property to
Negroes violates the Fourteenth Amendment); see Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633,
640 (1948); lagoun v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 293 (1898).
But cf. Peterson v. Iowa, 245 U.S. 170 (1917) ; Moody v. Hagen, 36 N.D. 471, 162 N.W.
704, aff'd per curiam sub non. Skarderud v. North Dakota Tax Commission, 245 U.S.
633 (1917).
3. E.g., CAx. Civ. CoDE § 1292 (1889), In re Comassi, 107 Cal. 1, 4, 40 Pac. 15, 16
(1895). See Matter of Delano, 176 N.Y. 486, 491, 68 N.E. 871, 872 (1903), off'd sub nom.
Chanler v. Kelsey, 205 U.S. 466 (1907).
4. E.g., N.Y. Dc. EsT. LAW § 47 (1909), Higgins v. Eaton, 188 Fed. 938
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1911), rev'd on other grounds, 202 Fed. 75 (2d Cir. 1913); Nt.C. Rzv.
LAws § 3113 (1905), Peace v. Edwards, 170 N.C. 64, 86 S.E. E07 (1915) ; Mnar. GEu.
STAT. c. 47 § 5 (1867), In re Penniman, 20 Mflnn. 245 (1873).
5. E.g., OMa. CoD- § 3066 (Hill, 1887), Hardenbergh v. Ray, 151 U.S. 112 (1894).
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few other states also stipulate who may receive a bequest or devise.' The
California Probate Code allows natural persons, the state, counties, and
fourteen types of public corporations and associations to take by will.7
"No other corporation can take under a will, unless expressly authorized by
statute." s Faced with this statute, the California Supreme Court, in Estate
of Burnison,9 invalidated a bequest to the United States Government.10
Doctrinally the California court was on firm ground. The Probate Code
discloses no legislative intent to include the United -States in any specific
class of eligible legatees."' No other California law mentions the Govern-
6. CAL. PRoB. CODE § 27 (Deering, 1949); New York's law, the first prohibiting
testamentary disposition to corporations not authorized by statute to take under a will,
applies only to devises. N.Y. DEc. EsT. LAW § 12, Downing v. Marshall, 23 N.Y. 366,
386 (1861). States subsequently enacting legislation narrowing classes of eligible
legatees extended the restriction to bequests. MONT. REy. CoDE tit. 91, § 104 (Choate &
Wertz, 1947) ; N.D. REv. CoDS § 56-0205 (1943) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84 § 45 (1938);
S.D. CoDE § 56.0205 (1939).
7. "A testamentary disposition may be made to the state, to counties, to municipal
corporations, to natural persons capable by law of taking the property, to unincorporated
religious, benevolent or fraternal societies or associations or lodges or branches thereof,
and to corporations formed for religious, scientific, literary, or solely educational or
hospital or sanitarium purposes, or primarily for the public preservation of forests or
natural scenery, or to maintain public libraries, museums or art galleries, or for similar
public purposes ... ." CAL. PROB. CODS § 27 (Deering, 1949).
The Section, as first enacted in 1872, CAL. CIV. CoDE § 1275 (1872), allowed no corpo-
ration to take from a California testator unless expressly permitted by statute. The
legislature, as expediency dictated, excepted one corporation after another from this
requirement of statutory authorization. No serious attempt has been made to rewrite
the provision in a more rational fashion. See Estate of Burnison, 33 Cal.2d 638, 641,
204 P.2d 330, 332 (1949) ; Bodfish, The Destructive Effect of the 1937 Amendment of
Section 42 of the Probate Code of California upon the Limitations Regarding Testa-
mentary Disposition to Charities, 26 CALiF. L. IEv. 309, 322 (1938).
8. CAL. PROB. CODE § 27 (Deering, 1949).
9. 33 Cal.2d 638, 204 P.2d 330, aff'd sib non. United States v. Burnison, 18 U.S.L.
WEEKi 4190 (U.S. March 13, 1950). Estate of Sanborn, 33 Cal.2d 647, 204 P.2d 335, aff~d
mb nor. United States v. Gayetty, 18 U.S.L. WEEK 4190 (U.S. March 13, 1950) was decided
the same day, and joined on appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
10. The few reported cases which have involved testamentary disposition to the
United States agree that the disposition's validity depends on state law. United States
v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315 (1876) (United States cannot be a devisee when prohibited by state
statute) ; Dickson v. United States, 125 Mass. 311 (1878) (Government can take when not
inhibited by state law) ; see United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625, 629 (1896) ; ef.
Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Ruhland, 222 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Mo. 1949). In England
the nation's right to take by will is well established. E.g., Re Smith, [1932] 1 Ch. 153;
Nightingale v. Goulburn, 5 Hare 484,67 Eng. Rep. 1003 (Ch. 1847), aff'd, 2 Ph. 594,41 Eng.
Rep. 1072 (Ch. 1848).
11. California confines eligible legatees to those specified by the Probate Code. E.g.,
Estate of Barter, 30 Cal2d 549, 184 P.2d 305 (1947) (British government ineligible);
In re Loring's Estate, 168 P.2d 224 (Cal. D. Ct. App.) rev'd on other grounds, 29 Cal.2d
423, 175 P.2d 524 (1946). Two years before the Burnison case, a California court had
validated a bequest to the Veterans Administration. The court felt that the legislature
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ment as a proper recipient of a testamentary gift.12 While federal law might
supply the necessary statutory authorization,' 3 no congressional statute of
general application authorizes the United States to acquire property by
will. 14 Thus a testamentary disposition to the United States is void, unless
the California law could be proved unconstitutional. And the Supreme
Court of the United States, reviewing the Burnison case on appeal, set this
doubt to rest by upholding California's right to bar bequests to the Govern-
ment.15
The Government maintained that the California statute could not stand
in the face of the Supremacy Clause.1 In the absence of restrictive state
legislation, the United States undoubtedly can accept a voluntary bequest
as an incident to its sovereignty.17 If in addition the Government's inherent
could scarcely have intended excluding the United States from taking under a California
testator's will. Estate of Hendrix, 77 Cal. App.2d 647, 652, 176 P2d 393, 401 (1947).
Although a federal statute authorized the Veterans Administration to take by will, see
note 14 infra, the statute was not essential to the decision. The dissenting judge in the
Burnison case believed that the Hendrix decision should be followed. 33 Cal2d 638, 646,
204 P.2d 330, 335 (1949). See also note 12 infra. For an implication that the drafters
of the Probate Code failed to anticipate exclusion of the Government from taking by will,
see Evans, Comments on the Probate Code of Calfornia, 19 CALw. L. R~v. 602. 609 (1931).
12. A corporation, while not mentioned in the Probate Code, may be authorized by
another statute to take by will. CA1. PROB. CoDE § 27 (Deering, 1949). Thus California
business corporations may be devisees. CAj. Coap. CODz A., § 802 (Deering, 1947).
The same privilege is extended domestic non-profit corporations. Id. § 9501. But the
Government is nowhere mentioned.
The legislature did, however, exempt property transferred to the United States from
the California inheritance tax. CAI. RNswUE AND TA:x CODE § 13841 (Deering, 1944).
While the United States can acquire property on death by contract, Stevens v. United
States, 302 U.S. 623 (1938), it seems more than likely that a transfer by will was con-
templated in granting the exemption.
13. See Estate of Burnison, 33 Cal.2d 638, 644, 204 P.2d 330, 333 (1949) ; f. Igle-
hart v. Iglehart, 204 U.S. 478 (1907) ; In re Hauge's Estate, 92 Mont. 36, 9 P.2d 106S
(1932). Compare Matter of Huss, 126 N.Y. 537, 27 N.E. 784 (1891), uills In re Crum,
98 Misc. 160, 164 N.Y. Supp. 149 (Surr. Ct. 1916).
14. Congress has, however, enacted nearly a score of statutes authorizing specific
agencies to accept bequests and devises. E.g., 60 STAT. 537,38 U.S.C. § 14 (1946) (Veter-
ans Administration); 58 STAT. 709 (1944), 42 U.S.C. § 219 (1946) (Public Health
Service). While these statutes have never been challenged their constitutionality would
seem certain. Cf. Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928) ; Johnson v. Maryland, 254
U.S. 51 (1920) ; Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276 (1899).
A bequest to the United States goes into "Miscellaneous Receipts," while a bequest
for a particular agency is entered in a special fund for that agency. Appellant's Statement
of Jurisdiction, p. 7 n.4, United States v. Burnison, 18 U.S.L. WN 4190 (U.S. March 13,
1950).
15. United States v. Burnison, 18 U.S.L. XVmx 4190 (U.S. March 13, 1950).
16. The Constitution "and the Laws of the United States ... and all Treaties ...
shall be the Supreme Law of the Land... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding," U.S. CoDNs. Art. VI.
17. Dickson v. United States, 125 Mass. 311 (1878) ; cf. Fay v. United States, 204
Fed. 559 (1st Cir. 1913) (inter vivos transfer) see Russell v. Allen, 107 U.S. 163, 170
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power to take under a will derived from one of the constitutionally enum-
erated powers, states could not interfere. But the Supreme Court rejected
this argument, holding that there is no overriding federal policy capable of
limiting state action.18
While legislatures can thus apparently forbid bequests to the United
States Government, the limitation is irrational and archaic. State laws
restricting bequests and devises are adaptations of the English Statute of
Wills,19 which was enacted primarily to prevent testamentary dispositions
to the Church. 2 Although this reason has long since vanished, the restraint
on a testator's power to convey his property remains.
21
(1882). The United States appears to have "resultant" powers, i.x., those neither ex-
pressed in the Constitution, nor implied by any of its provisions, but which result from
the sum of all of its powers. E.g., Neilson v. Lagow, 12 How. 98, 107 (U.S. 1891) (to
take security for a debt) ; United States v. Bradley, 10 Pet. 343, 359 (U.S. 1836) (same) ;
United States v. Tingey, 5 Pet. 115, 127 (U.S. 1831) (to enter into contracts) ; Dugan v.
United States 3 Wheat. 172, 181 (U.S. 1818) (to sue in its own name). But cf. Kansas
v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 90 (1907) (powers of a national character not delegated by the
Constitution "are reserved to the people").
18. United States v. Burnison, 18 U.S.L. WExx 4190 (March 13, 1950).
This conclusion also disposed of an alternative claim that California, by permitting
testamentary gifts to itself while forbidding them to the United States was unlawfully dis-
criminating against the Federal Government. Id. at 4192. Under the Supremacy Clause
a state may not refuse to enforce a right based on federal law while enforcing one based
on its own law. E.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) ; Republic Pictures Corp. v.
Kappler, 151 F.2d 543, 546-7 (8th Cir. 19,15). By analogizing the capacity of the United
States to take by will to a right based on federal law, the Government contended that
California was unlawfully discriminating. But the Supreme Court disposed of this
contention under its previous conclusion that the "power'" of accepting bequests could not
be elevated to the level of a "right" to do so. And the Court further held that the mere
fact that the United States is being treated differently from California constitutes no
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 18 U.S.L. Wzm 4192.
The Supreme Court had previously intimated that mere incidents to sovereignty are
not, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, immune from curtailment by state legislationt.
See, e.g., Neilson v. Lagow, 12 How. 98, 107 (U.S. 1851) ; United States v. Tingey, 5
Pet. 115, 127 (U.S. 1831). See also, Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Commission, 318 U.S.
261 (1943) (where Congress has not specifically exempted sales of milk to United States
Army from state milk control law, the Constitution itself implies no immunity from state
control).
19. 34, 35 HEN. VIII c. 5- (1542-1543) (a devise may be made to any person except
"bodies politick and corporate").
20. The first Statute of Wills, 32 Hm. VIII c, 1 (1540), very nearly ended the earlier
ban on testation. Henry evidently felt this was too liberal, for in 1542 he introduced the
second Statute of Wills. See note 19 supra. Ostensibly designed to explain the earlier
enactment, 4 HOLDSWORTH, A HIsTORy or ENGLISH LAw 466 (1st ed. 1924), the second
statute was really aimed at ending the priestly practice of high-pressuring dying pa-
rishioners to devise their lands to the Church. 2 BL. CoMr. *375.
21. Courts have rarely attempted to justify the continued existence of restrictive will
statutes. They are occasionally defended on the ground that corporate ownership in
perpetuity should be prevented. Downing v. Marshall, 23 N.Y. 366, 386 (1861). This
explanation applies only to devises, and even as so applied is not particularly convincing.
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Fortunately, these statutory carry-overs from a feudal society are easily
avoided. Testators have no difficulty in bequeathing property to ineligible
legatees. Indeed, several drafting devices are available to effectuate the
purpose frustrated in the Burnison case. The simplest method is a bequest
to the United States in trust for the American people. 2 Although the Gov-
ernment, if it is prohibited from accepting the bequest, cannot serve as
trustee,23 the court has power to appoint a competent substitute. Califor-
nia's Supreme Court, in deciding the Burnison case, might well have implied
such a trust.24 Similarly, a testamentary disposition to a federal official, in
trust for governmental purposes, might succeed.25 Also, a transfer at death
to the Secretary of the Treasury or any other Government official, probably
would not be disqualified as a transfer to the United States.!' While the
grantor cannot bind the Government officer, he can express in the document
For the typical restrictive statute allows any corporation to take under a will if it is
authorized by law to do so, and there are few corporations not so authorized. See note
12 supra. Moreover, the explanation makes little sense when applied to the United States
which already owns 46,484,391 acres of California land in perpetuity, some 46 per cent
of the total land in the state. STATisnlcAL AB sRAcr OF THE UNITED STATES 160 (1949).
One judge has advanced the novel theory that restrictions against testamentary bene-
factions exist to prevent those who will not be charitable during their lives from being
charitable after death. Coleman v. Whipple, 191 Miss. 287, 302, 2 So2d 565, 569 (1941)
(dissenting opinion).
22. Cf. Estate of Barter, 30 Cal2d 549, 184 P2d 305 (1947) (bequest to British
Government for the benefit of refugee children); Gould v. Board of Home Missions, 102
Neb. 526, 167 N.,V. 776 (1918). Contra: Levy v. Levy, 33 N.Y. 97, 122 (1865) (alter-
native holding) (devise to United States for benefit of children of Naval personnel); see
In re Fox, 52 N.Y. 530, 533 (1873), aff'd sub noin. United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315
(1876).
23. Catt v. Catt, 118 App. Div. 742, 103 N.Y. Supp. 740 (1st Dep't 1907) ; ef. Estate
of Barter, 30 Cal.2d 549, 184 P.2d 305 (1947). Where no restrictive state statute inter-
venes, however, there is no objection to the Government's serving as trustee. Yale
College's Appeal, 67 Conn. 237, 34 Atl. 1036 (1896) ; Dickson v. United States, 125 Mass.
311 (1878).
24. Cf. Doughton v. Vandever, 5 Del. Ch. 51, 77 (1875) ; Yard's Appeal, 64 Pa. 95,
100 (1870) ; ZoLLtAx, AzMRCAN LAw OF CHAMrrIES § 473 (1924).
25. This device might prove more satisfactory than a bequest to the Government itself
in trust. See notes 23 and 24 supra. There would, at least, be no doubt that the trustee
could serve. Estate of Robinson, 63 Cal. 620 (1883) (bequest to the Mayor of San
Francisco for the destitute of that city upheld where outright bequest to the city would have
failed). See the discussion of the Robinson case in In re Loring's Estate, 163 P.2d 224,
231 (Cal. D. Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 29 Cal2d 423, 175 P.2d 524 (1946). Cf.
Christian Church v. Church of Christ, 219 Ill. 503, 513, 76 N.E. 703, 705 (1906) (to
trustees of "Christian Church") ; Tucker v. Seaman's Aid Society, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 188,
200 (1843). For a variation of this device, see Rine v. Wagner, 135 Iowa 626, 113 N.W.
471 (1907) (to "Right Reverend James O'Connor, bishop of Omaha... [or] his suc-
cessor" for charitable purposes).
26. Cf. Flood v. Ryan, 220 Pa. 450, 69 At. 908 (1908) (to "Most Rev. J. J. Ryan
archbishop of Philadelphia") ; In re Hodnett, 154 Pa. 485, 26 At. 623 (1893) (to "the
pastor of the St. Joha's R.C. Church"). A bequest to an individual in trust for a charity,
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his wishes that the property be devoted to Government use.- And, finally, a
grantor could establish an inter vivos trust, reserving a life estate and a
power to revoke, and naming the United States as beneficiary.28 Under this
device the grantor retains use of the property for life and the eligible legatee
statute is avoided on two counts: the transfer is inter vivos and it is to a
private trustee.
It is unrealistic for states to invalidate direct bequests to the United
States if drafting devices can accomplish the same result indirectly. States
with restrictive statutes should enlarge the class of eligible legatees to in-
clude the United States. If state laws are not broadened, however, a federal
statute authorizing the Government to take by will should be enacted. This
would permit bequests to the Government in those states which, like Cali-
fornia, require express authorization "by statute." A law of this type would
not raise problems under the Tenth Amendment so long as it recognized
the states' apparently primary power to determine testamentary succes-
sion.29 Although this legislation would solve the problem of bequests to the
however, would fail wherever the charity could not take directly. In re Houk's Estate,
186 Cal. 643, 200 Pac. 417 (1921).
This avoidance device has the further advantage of simultaneously escaping additional
statutes Which limit the portion of an estate a testator may leave for charitable uses.
Cf. CAi. PRoB. CODE §§ 40-43 (Deering, 1949); MoNT. REv. COD tit. 91, § 142 (Choate &
Wertz, 1947); N.Y. DEc. EsT. LAW § 17; Tiaompsox, W.L.s § 24 (3d ed. 1947). If
property is left to a government official, it cannot be said to be devoted to charitable uses.
27. Cf., e.g., Estill v. Ballew, 26 S.W.2d 778 (Mo. 1930) ("I request that she. .. ") ;
Matter of Keleman, 126 N.Y. 73, 26 N.E. 968 (1891). The principal weakness of preca-
tory language is that the legatee and his successors in interest remain wholly unbound.
ZOLLMAN, op. cit. supra note 24, § 512 ("Human Nature is Human Nature, and the risk
of an abuse of the confidence reposed is always present").
Should the legatee be notified of the testator's wish before his death, courts may infer
the creation of a secret trust, though the legatee has never expressed assent. In such a
case, the charitable beneficiary would be limited to the statutory share of the estate. See
Smith v. Havens Relief Fund Society, 44 Misc. 594, 614, 90 N.Y. Supp. 168, 179 (Sup.
Ct. 1904) ; Gore v. Clarke, 37 S.C. 537, 550, 16 S.E. 614, 619 (1892). Contra: O'Donnell
v. Murphy, 17 Cal. App. 625, 120 Pac. 1076 (1911), where the legatee advised the testa-
trix that her bequest would fail if left in trust, whereupon she revised her will leaving
the bequest to the legatee absolutely. Cf. lt re Bickley's Estate, 270 Pa. 101, 113 Atl. 68
(1921) (bequest to charity or in the alternative to head of charity).
28. Cf., e.g., President of Bowdoin College v. Merritt, 75 Fed. 480 (C.C.N.D. Cal.
1896), appeal dismissed, 167 U.S. 745 (1897); Cleveland Trust Co. v. White, 134 Ohio
St. 1, 15 N.E2d 627 (1938). See Leaphart, The Use, A Factor it the Law Today, 79
U. OF PA. L. REv. 253, 261 (1931). This is the principal and most effective device for
escaping testamentary restraints. It, too, will avoid any state law allowing only a small
percentage of an estate to be bequeathed or devised for charitable uses. See note 26
supra. A settlor who retains too much control, however, may be fonnd to have made no
transfer at all. In re Tunnell, 325 Pa. 554, 190 Atl. 906 (1937) (settlor constituted himself
trustee, retaining right to income and power to revoke or modify the trust).
29. -E.g., Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586 (1936) ; Duke Power Co.
v. Greenwood County, 91 F2d 665, 673 (4th Cir. 1937), af'd, 302 U.S. 485 (1938).
On. the other hand, it is not certain whether a law categorically asserting the unre-
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United States, it would fail to eliminate the anachronistic local prohibitions
which prevent disposition to other disfavored legatees.r) Among the most
frequent sufferers under these prohibitions are municipal, state and foreign
governments. While these restrictions seem unjustified in any event, they
are especially objectionable when invoked against domestic governments.
There is every reason to honor the claims of financially hard-pressed mu-
nicipalities to bequests. And it is anomolous to discourage concentration of
stricted right of the United States to take by will would survive constitutional objections.
Prior to the Burnison case, the virtual demise of the Tenth Amendment seemed to indicate
that no very strenuous protest against the statute could be formulated. Cf. United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). See Feller, The Tenth Amcnidment Retires, 27
A.B.A.J. 223 (1941). And the Burnison case provided no clear holding on this issue, since
no federal statute was involved. The Court, however, intimated that the power to deter-
mine who may take by will is one of the powers reserved to the states by the Tenth
Amendment. See United States v. Burnison, 18 U.S.L. WNzs 4190, 4191 (U.S.1March 13,
1950). A future holding to this effect would invalidate federal legislation creating in the
United States the unrestricted power to take by will.
Certainly an argument defending an absolute federal right to inherit would be
difficult to frame. TheDarby case, supra, involved a specific section of the Con-
stitution, the Commerce Clause, while a statute reducing local control over inheritance
would have to be based on a more nebulous power. The ability of the United States
to take under a will may result from the sum of all powers. See note 17 stspra. But
it is apparently not immune from state legislation. Stevens v. United States, 89 F.2d
151, 154 (1937), rev'd on other grounds, 302 U.S. 623 (1938) ; see Neilson v. Lagow, 12
How. 98, 107 (U.S. 1851); United States v. Tingey, 5 Pet. 115, 127 (U.S. 1831).
The Federal Government's power to take by will has been termed inherent. Dickson
v. United States, 125 Mass. 311, 315 (1878). But it is frequently insisted that the United
States does not have such powers. See Williams, Inherent Saereign Powers of the
Federal Government, 6 UxivERsI OF SOUTH CAROLINA, YEAM.aOK OP THE S.LDMZ Soi-
r 1 (1942). In fact, the strongest denial of inherent power, Kansas v. Colorado, 206
U.S. 46 (1906), has not yet been directly attacked. See Scorr, JuDxcrA. SL,"ru7rs
OF CoNmovEmsiEs BmEEN STATES OF THE AelmicAx UNIoN 431-53 (1919) ; 1 Wn-
LOUGHEy, CoNs'n=oxsAL LAW OF THE UITED STATEs § 58 (2d ed. 1929). Although
Willoughby attempts to differentiate between "resultant" and "inherent" powers, id. § 54,
the distinction seems ephemeral. Cf. Feller, The Tenth Amendment Retires, 27 A.B.A.J.
223, 225 (1941) ; 2 STORY, COMMXTARIES ON THE CoNs w'rom', §§ 1256, 1279 (5th ed,
Bigelow, 1891).
If, despite these constitutional difficulties, the Federal Government should adopt a
law avowing an absolute right to accept voluntary legacies, several state statutes might
prove useful models. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7.09-7.12 (1946) ; Mo. r%-V. STAT.
ANN. § 643 (Supp. 1949).
30. See note 6 supra. The statutes are summarized in Bordwell, The Statute Law of
Wills, 14 IowA L. REv. 1, 198 (1928). California, Montana and New York have enforced
their enactments rigorously. See, e.g., In re Loring's Estate, 168 P.2d 224 (Cal. D. Ct.
App.), rev'd on other grounds, 29 Cal.2d 423, 175 P.2d 524 (1946) (bequest to Iowa tovM) ;
I re Beck's Estate, 44 Mont. 561, 121 Pac. 784 (1912) (bequest to State of Montana) ;
In re Fox, 52 N.Y. 530 (1873), aff'd sub sonr. United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315 (1876)
(devise to United States). Oklahoma has been more liberal. Phillips v. Chambers, 174
Okla. 407, 51 P2d 303 (1935) (county not a corporation within meaning of statute pro-
hibiting corporations from taking under a will).
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